Abstract. For large systems, the manual construction of fault trees is errorprone, encouraging automated techniques. In this paper we show how the retrenchment approach to formal system model evolution can be developed into a versatile structured approach for the mechanical construction of fault trees. The system structure and the structure of retrenchment concessions interact to generate fault trees with appropriately deep nesting. The same interactions fuel a structural approach to hierarchical fault trees, allowing a system and its faults to be viewed at multiple levels of abstraction. We show how this approach can be extended to deal with minimisation, thereby diminishing the post-hoc subsumption workload and potentially rendering some infeasible cases feasible. The techniques we describe readily generalise to encompass timing, allowing glitches and other transient errors to be properly described. Lastly, a mild generalisation to cope with cyclic system descriptions allows the timed theory to encompass systems with feedback.
Introduction
Reliability analysis of complex systems traditionally involves a set of activities which help engineers understand the system behaviour in degraded conditions, that is, when some parts of the system are not working properly. These activities have the goal of identifying all possible hazards of the system, together with their respective causes. The identification of hazards is a necessary step for safety-critical applications, to ensure that the system meets the safety requirements that are required for its deployment and use.
Among the safety analysis activities, a very popular one is Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [30] . It is an example of deductive analysis, which, given the specification of an undesired state -usually a failure state-systematically builds all possible chains of one of more basic faults that contribute to the occurrence of the event. The result of the analysis is a fault tree, that is, a graphical representation of the logical interrelationships of the basic events that lead to the undesired state.
The manual construction of fault trees relies on the ability of the safety engineer to understand and to foresee the system behaviour. As a consequence, it is a timeconsuming and error-prone activity, and may rapidly become impractical in case of Work partly supported by the E.U. ISAAC project, contract no. AST3- CT-2003-501848. large system models. Therefore, in recent years there has been a growing interest in formally based techniques to automate the production of fault trees [15, 13] .
The starting point is our previous work relating retrenchment [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 3] and formal system model evolution [4] . Namely, in [4] we showed how retrenchment, as opposed to conventional refinement, can provide a formal account of the relationship between the abstract system model, that is the model of the system in nominal conditions, and the concrete system model, that is the model enriched with a description of the envisaged faults the system is designed to be robust against.
In this paper we show how retrenchment can be developed into a versatile structured approach for the mechanical construction of fault trees. Building on the ideas sketched in [4] , where we exemplified the generation of a fault tree on a two-bit adder example, in this paper we show how the simulation relation of retrenchment can be used to systematically derive fault trees built upon the system structure. This is achieved by exploiting the structure of retrenchment concessions, using suitable notions of composition to gather the degraded cases into the concession of a composed retrenchment. We show how these techniques can be readily generalised in order to deal with issues like timing and cycles, thus paving the way for the analysis of dynamic systems and systems with feedback. Finally, we show how the interactions between the system structure and the structure of concessions yield a structural approach to hierarchical fault trees, allowing a system and its faults to be viewed at multiple levels of abstraction.
The techniques we present in this paper improve over the ones discussed in [13] , in that they allow the mechanical generation of fault trees built upon the system structure, which are more informative than the flat (two-level) fault trees of [13] . Furthermore, we demonstrate the potential of our approach by exemplifying how these techniques can be fruitfully adapted to address the problem of generating the minimal cut sets of a fault tree. We show that, by annotating the generated subtrees with suitable minimisation directives, it is possible to perform some minimisations locally, thereby diminishing the post-hoc, brute-force subsumption workload of traditional minimisation algorithms.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review retrenchment and relevant notions of composition of retrenchments. In Section 3 we present our retrenchment directed approach to the generation of hierarchical and structured fault trees on a running example. In Section 4 we show how the structured analysis can be modified to reduce the work of finding the minimal cut sets of some fault condition. In Section 5 we extend the method to deal with internal state in the subsystem being treated, which is relatively straightforward as long as the subsystem remains acyclic, and in Section 6 we discuss the issues raised by cyclicity and feedback. Finally, in Section 7 we discuss some related work and we outline some conclusions.
Systems, Retrenchments and Compositions
In this paper we describe systems using input/output transformers. So in general, a (sub)system will consist of a collection of I/O relations, each describing the behaviour of a component, and with (sub)system structure expressed by the identification of predecessor component outputs with successor component inputs; obviously some inputs and outputs remain free to allow communication with the environment. We can write such components using a relational notation Thing´i oµ, where i and o can be tuples, eg. i x y z in the case of multi-input/output components. Retrenchment [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 3] , was introduced to provide a formal vehicle for describing more flexible model evolution steps than the usual technique for formal system development, refinement, conventionally allows. Since refinement was conceived with the desire to ensure that the next model conformed to properties of its predecessor, while moving towards greater implementability, it is no surprise that not all model evolutions that one might conceivably find useful fall under its scope.
In this paper, it is the simulation relation of retrenchment which does the work. This can be expressed as follows. Suppose To consider large systems, we need mechanisms to express hierarchy and composition. Fortunately these are straightforward. To express hierarchy, it will be sufficient to decompose the concession into a number of cases covering distinct fault possibilities: 
where is relational union. Parallel composition is even easier. Assuming this time that Op½ and Op¾ act on independent sets of variables, and using to denote parallel composition (which, in terms of logic, is just conjunction), the rules are:
We see the strong analogy between the two. Moreover, these interact cleanly both with each other, and with the hierarchy mechanism. Thus if C Op½ is a disjunction of n terms, and C Op¾ of m terms, the lower level versions of C Op½;¾ and C Op½ ¾ have mn · m · n terms, corresponding to the substitution of the low level forms into C Op½;¾ or C Op½ ¾ respectively.
Hierarchy and Fault Tree Structure in a Running Example
In Fig. 1 we see a small circuit which will serve as a running example. At a high level it is a black box called Fred with two inputs I½ I¾ and two outputs O½ O¾. At a low level, it is a circuit in which signals flow from left to right, elements A½ A¾ A¿ are adders, and F½ F¾ F¿ are two-output fanout nodes. We assume that all signals are of a fixed finite number of bits, and that the adders do cutoff addition (which is to say that any value greater than or equal to the maximum representable one is output as the maximum, and there is no overflow). The number of bits is assumed sufficiently large that the cutoff effects do not occur in the examples we treat. The two diagrams in Fig. 1 represent a descent of one level in a hierarchical description of (part of) a large system. We turn to the internal structure of Fred. For the time being, all elements are stateless, and all circuits are acyclic. Such circuits possess a parsing which builds them up via sequential and parallel composition. In general there will be several such parsings. We choose the one in which the elements closest to the inputs are the most deeply nested: it can be derived mechanically from a definition of the circuit in terms of elements and connections, or supplied manually. Such a structure is in sympathy with a top-down fault analysis starting at the outputs. For Fred the structuring is illustrated in K¼-K . , is given using renamed variables for clarity. Thus the external inputs/outputs are J½ J¾ and P½ P¾ respectively, and the internal variables a½-a become c½-c . We assume that only the fanouts can have faults, and that these are simply 'stuck at 0' faults on one or other output, signalled by the truth of additional free boolean variables F½ c½ (F½ output c½ 'stuck at 0') etc. We assume (purely for simplicity) that only one fault can be active in any component (at any time). Thus while the adders A½ C A¾ C A¿ C in Fred C are given by mere transliterations of the A½ A A¾ A A¿ A relations above to J P c variables, the fanouts need full redefinition, eg.:
Introducing names for the internal variables implicitly, the ideal
In this, ONE ´F½ c½ F½ c¾µ and ELSE IDEAL represents the transliteration of F½ A to J P c variables, when not overridden by the faulty behaviour of the preceding terms.
The ideal and faulty Fred models are related by a retrenchment. It will be sufficient to write down the retrenchment data for just the components, since the data for the overall system will emerge as needed from the fault tree analysis below. For the adders, assumed fault-free, we have for A½: W A½´ a¾ a¿ c¾ c¿ µ true O A½´a c a¾ a¿ c¾ c¿ µ ´c c¾ · c¿µ C A½´a c a¾ a¿ c¾ c¿ µ false with similar things for A¾ A¿; a particular consequence of this is that occurrences of C A terms can be dropped below. For the fanouts, we need the more complicated:
In C F½ , following Section 2, we call the two disjuncts C F½ c½ and C F½ c¾ respectively, i.e. C F½ C F½ c½ C F½ c¾ . Similar things hold for F¾ F¿. Note that the abstract system is not mentioned in the body of the retrenchment data; it is not needed in this application. With these ingredients, and a given top level event (TLE), we show how the retrenchment data drive a structured fault analysis. First, if it is of interest to check whether the TLE can arise via fault-free behaviour, it is sufficient to check whether the TLE will unify with O Fred . This is easy to calculate from the assumed parse K¼-K and the rules of Section 2, since we will assume that for all components, correct working is given by a total function, and even incorrect working is a total relation. 4 Second, we proceed downward through C Fred , decomposing step by step, eliciting the consequences of composition and of local structure, and deriving a resolution tree for all possible ways of satisfying the TLE within the constraints. Values of variables once assigned, remain in force as we descend unless we backtrack past the point of assignment, and once the input values have been reached, any remaining uninstantiated variables can be instantiated within the constraints that hold, case by case, to confirm overall consistency. Now we consider the specific TLE: J½ J¾ P½ ½ (with P¾ regarded as irrelevant). It is easy to check that this does not satisfy O Fred . The analysis then proceeds as follows. 
TLE: K¼ K¾
Ó K½, so C K¼ O K¾ Ó C K½ C K¾ Ó O K½ C K¾ Ó C K½ .
TLE.R.3: We have C K¿
Ó C F¿ c as a consequence of which F¿ c holds, and c is unconstrained. We seek all possible ways of satisfying C K¿ given the inputs J½ ½ and J¾ ½. Now K¿ is a parallel composition of F½ and F¾, so C K¿ will contain three terms as usual. Now each of C F½ and C F¾ is a disjunction of two terms, but c½ ½ prevents F½ c½ from holding so C F½ has just one term that contributes nontrivially. This leads to an overall disjunction of five nontrivial terms.
TLE.R.4: We have C K¿
Ó C F¿ c and c ¼. The latter generates only one solution, i.e. F½ c¾ and F¾ c¿ must both hold.
A tree that depicts the above is shown in Fig. 2 . Near the top we show the variable assignments, but suppress them lower down to save space, recording only the fault variables set at various points. 5 Although Fig. 2 is not syntactically a fault tree (FT) according to [30] , it is easy to see that it could be straightforwardly transformed into one. We do this in Section 4 after minimisation. At any rate the present tree represents a low level view of the fault analysis.
In terms of the hierarchy of which Fred forms a part, a higher level view just represents the fault by a single node: the TLE node itself. Descending the hierarchy thus corresponds to growing the more detailed tree along with uncovering the internal structure of Fred. Evidently the algorithm described in this section can be easily incorporated into one which deals with large systems in a hierarchical fashion. Whenever a fault tree for a given model has been computed, a pure refinement of a subsystem does not require rebuilding the whole fault tree from scratch. More drastic subsystem evolution, going beyond pure refinements, can imply more widespread changes to fault trees. 
Structured Minimisation
In practical fault analysis we are most interested in minimal fault configurations, the so-called minimal cut sets (MCSs for short) consisting of the fewest possible basic faults that cause a particular TLE. The traditional technique for discovering MCSs is subsumption. In principle, one needs to generate all possible configurations that cause a fault, and then check them against one another: any that are subsumed by simpler configurations are discarded. These subsumption checks can be quite expensive for a large system model, since the number of leaves in a tree is exponential in its depth, and the number of subsumption checks is quadratic in the number of leaves. Although in practice efficient algorithms [17, 18, 27, 28] based on binary decision diagrams (BDDs) [16] can be used for this purpose, their worst-case complexity is still exponential in the number of variables of the BDD. In this section we explore ways of reducing the subsumption workload by exploiting the structure of the tree construction as guided by the retrenchment data. The various minimisations are illustrated on the running example.
M.1:
Discarding non-needed subtrees. If, during the construction, a fault is generated which leads to an assignment to some variable whose value does not affect the validity of the TLE (eg. there is no dataflow from the fault to the TLE), then the fault node (and, implicitly, any subtree rooted at it) can be discarded immediately since the TLE is satisfied without it. In general, we call such faults incidental faults. As in the case of the subtree of Fig. 2 rooted at F¿ c , which is an example, such faults can arise by considering the disjunction of the complete range of possible faulty configurations of some otherwise needed component.
M.2:
Discarding locally subsumed expressions. If, during the construction, a range of options to explore is generated, some of which are subsumed by others, the subsumed options can be discarded immediately. Eg. in Fig. 2 , F¾ c¿ subsumes F½ c¾ F¾ c¿.
(N.B. The example in M.1 can also be viewed this way.) M.3: Discarding subtrees at input-insensitive faults. If, during the construction, a fault is generated which is independent of any input to the component in question, the subtree beneath it can be discarded immediately. Eg. in Fig. 2 Fig. 2 . Such cases can also be viewed as instances of M.2 provided satisfiability of O K¿ is prima facie unproblematic.) M.4: Doing final subsumption checking at the subsystem level. The techniques outlined above are not guaranteed to be complete, insofar as further minimisations to generate the MCSs may remain. Rather than leaving these to a final whole-model subsumption check, the brute force subsumption checking to catch them can be done at the subsystem level, since all contributions to the TLE for a fault in a subsystem like Fred are causally propagated along data pathways within the subsystem (a structural assumption we take for granted.) Thus the inclusion of the rest of the system will result in an overall description which necessarily factorises, regardless of whether or not the factorisation is obscured (whether to a human observer or to some algorithm) by the complexity of the final expression.
The precise way in which the preceding ideas can be implemented in a tool (such as the FSAP/NuSMV-SA platform [13] ) remain a matter for implementation tactics. For example, the subsystem parse could be decorated with suitable directives to prompt the FT generation algorithm to apply certain minimisations when the appropriate point is encountered, or the FT generation algorithm may be written so as to check for the whole range of recognised minimisation opportunities every time another stage in the tree is developed. Internal optimisations, such as the sharing of subcomputations not visible at the FT level, can also be deployed. Details lie beyond the scope of this paper.
When we apply the above to the running example whose resolution tree is indicated in Fig. 2 , we get a considerably smaller tree. We transform this into a legal FT as per [30] , containing just the MCSs, by accumulating the variable assignments along any path between two logical connectives into the label for an intermediate event (IE), and changing the basic fault nodes into round ones. 6 When we do all this, we end up with the minimised fault tree in Fig. 3 . 
Timing and Internal State
Up to now everything has been treated as instantaneous, and the job of fault tree analysis has simply been to trace the possible functional (or more generally, relational) dependencies that connect the inputs and outputs in a given TLE, and thereby, to display the connections between the primitive faults that contribute to valid instances of the TLE. This instantaneous assumption is obviously not adequate for all situations of interest, and so in this section, we introduce a model of time, in order to capture the behaviour of systems in which time delays cannot be neglected. Since many of the digital components that are found in circuits such as our running example are stateful, this generalisation is an important one. We introduce discrete time, with ticks labelled by integers, and for ease of exposition we just modify slightly our running example. The adders will remain stateless, delivering their result instantaneously, while the fanouts will introduce a unit delay between an input received and the outputs delivered. Thus while the definition of the adders remains unaltered aside from the introduction of a time parameter, eg. A½ A´ a¾´tµ a¿´tµ a ´tµµ a ´tµ a¾´tµ · a¿´tµ, the definition of the fanouts becomes eg. F½ A´I ½´tµ a½´t · ½µ a¾´t · ½µ µ a½´t · ½µ a¾´t · ½µ I½´tµ. As well as this, the fault variables become time dependent (to permit the description of eg. glitches), but otherwise, the relational descriptions of components are time independent. So the faulty behaviour of F½ becomes:
Let Fred with these alterations be renamed FreT (we will continue to refer to Fig. 2) . With this change, the retrenchment data for FreT become:
(We omit the retrenchment data for the adders, which just get labelled by '´tµ'.) With this setup, in fact very little changes as regards the top down resolution driven fault tree analysis, provided we remember that our subsystems are all still finite component, finite signal, finite state, and acyclic. The reason that there is little change is that the set of paths through the subsystem, between inputs and outputs, remains unaltered by the mere introduction of time delays along them -fault tree analysis (in the sense of this paper) can in the end be seen as a deductive process about such paths and sets of such paths. The fault trees resulting from the time sensitive analysis can of course be differently shaped from those in the time independent one, since the same component may contribute in different ways at different times.
To illustrate the above, let us do an analysis for the FreT subsystem of the same TLE we considered previously, but this time with the output P½ instantiated to 1 for some time t (and otherwise unspecified), and with inputs held constant at 1 as before, which we write as J½ J¾ P½´tµ ½. Doing the analysis as described in Section 3, but this time noting the time labels along the way, and then doing the minimisation as described in Section 4, we get the FT in Fig. 4 , in which preprimes denote the value at t ½, and the labelling of the IEs is incomplete for space reasons (a full labelling would cite values at t and at t ½ for several variables). Note how the fact that the output is not required to be constant, has spawned a valid instance of the branch of the FT that was cut off in Fig. 2 . We are only demanding a glitch, so the two F½ faults that could not coexist statically, are permitted to occur at successive instants. Of course if we asked for the glitch to persist for two time ticks, this branch would get cut off once more. This example vividly illustrates the increased expressive power gained by adding timing to essentially the same techniques that we discussed statically.
c1,′ c5,c6 = 0,1,1 
Introducing Feedback
The (technically) relatively mild generalisation of the last section becomes more interesting when we include feedback as well as timing delays. We modify our subsystem FreT by removing A¿ and F¾, and introducing a feedback signal (called k in the concrete system) from F¿ to A½, resulting in subsystem Jim. See Fig. 5 . Now we can no longer rely on a static syntactic description of the subsystem as the analysis proceeds, but must unfold a recursive structure. This is a standard feedback control system, and its I/O behaviour can be computed by standard means. Performing the required back substitutions (details omitted for lack of space), we get:
This is a shorthand for describing an infinite set of possible finite behaviours, on the understanding that all values are (bounded) natural numbers, and that an at most finite number of the I½ values in the summation are non-zero (and that one cuts off the summation at some point after the earliest non-zero value, to represent initialisation at a point in the finite past). The proliferation in behaviours is due to the fact that A½'s output remains stable when its c¾ input is 0, so that the value held in F¿ (and hence output at O½) remains invariant as long as I½ continues to remain at 0. Admittedly we have been considering the fault-free behaviour of Jim for the sake of simplicity, but there is no reason at all why similar situations should not arise during the analysis of genuine faults. The back substitutions performed from the TLE 'O½´tµ ¾' are exactly the steps that a retrenchment based fault analysis would dictate.
There are at least three approaches to the question of there being an infinity of possible causes of some situation, just raised. Firstly one could simply regard the TLE as underspecified, since it places no constraints on the input values. Any finite constraint on these that is consistent with the TLE and supplies all the values 'needed' by the TLE 7 would immediately reduce the set of possible causes to a finite one, eliminating the problem. Essentially we would be placing an a priori bound on how far in the past the earliest of the causes of the TLE had occurred, an approach that in general is incomplete.
Secondly, one could examine what a standard model checking approach (such as the FSAP/NuSMV-SA platform [13] ) would deliver. Such approaches work by exhaustive search of the state space of the system, keeping an eye out for states already encountered along a given path. Finding a repeated occurrence of the same state, cuts off the search, since it is interpreted as looping behaviour in the system. In our example this would yield a finite representation of the infinite set of possible behaviours, analogously to the way that the infinite summation above is a finite representation of it.
The stable behaviour of the adders previously alluded to is reflected in self-loops on the relevant states generated by the state space search algorithm. Such a representation would require some interpretation as regards the generation of fault trees, since a naive FT generation algorithm would attempt to generate a tree with infinite disjunctions, and not terminate. Adding a finite starting point in the past is an easy way to prevent this, although as above, an a priori finite bound in the past makes the approach incomplete.
A third, and most sophisticated approach to the issue, is to honestly take on board the control nature of the cyclic system, and to combine the model checking strategy with deeper insights about control systems. 8 The benefits of such an approach are that it could yield a complete description, by representing recursive parts of the set of behaviours in a suitably symbolic manner, even extending to situations in which the state space is not finite. However all of this would require deep insight into the relationship between decidabilities in the relevant model checking and control theory domains, since it is well known that combining theories which are decidable on their own, does not automatically lead to decidability of the combination.
Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a formal account of fault tree generation based on retrenchment. We have shown how the retrenchment framework is able to capture several aspects of the fault tree generation, namely the mechanical construction of a fault tree based on structural information, fault tree minimization, system model evolution based on a hierarchy of models viewed at multiple levels of abstraction, and fault injection. Finally, the approach can be generalised to deal with dynamic and cyclic systems.
Our work has been inspired by Hip-HOPS (Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation Studies) [24, 25, 26] , a framework incorporating a mechanical fault tree synthesis algorithm based on system structure, and taking into account model evolution. The synthesis of the fault tree is based on a preliminary functional failure analysis (FFA) and a tabular technique (IF-FMEA) used to generate a model of the local failure behaviour, activities normally performed manually during system design and safety assessment. Our work addresses the automation of the whole process assuming that a formal specification of both system and fault model is available. Furthermore, we have shown how the synthesis algorithm can be coupled with suitable tactics to perform local minimal cut-set computation, reducing the overall computational effort.
Our techniques can be incorporated into formal tools supporting the safety assessment of complex systems, like the FSAP/NuSMV-SA platform [13, 20] . The algorithms described here improve over the ones used there for two reasons. First, they allow the generation of structured fault trees, which are more informative than the flat fault trees produced by the current FSAP platform. Second, they allow the taking of dynamic information into account, eg. they can deal with transient failures (Section 5), and feedback (Section 6). While our focus was on automatic synthesis, the DIFTree (Dynamic Innovative Fault Tree) [22] methodology, implemented in the Galileo tool [29] , is mainly concerned with the problem of fault tree evaluation. It uses a modularisation technique [19] to identify (in linear time) independent sub-trees, that can be evaluated using the most appropriate techniques (BDD-based techniques for static fault trees, Markov techniques or Monte Carlo simulation for dynamic ones). In addition, it supports different probability distributions for component failures. A similar modularisation and decomposition technique is advocated in [2] . That technique is orthogonal to our notion of structural generation; in particular, it is concerned with isolating different sub-trees that can be synthesised (or evaluated) separately, whereas our structural information can be used to synthesise (or evaluate) each sub-tree on its own.
Although an experimental evaluation of our algorithm was beyond the scope of this paper, we have provided many hints about the advantages such an algorithm would have with respect to the traditional monolithic algorithms which just flatten the model. First, it makes it possible to synthesise the fault tree by considering each component in isolation, thus avoiding building an internal representation of the whole model (eg. avoiding the generation of a BDD for it). Second, it suggests that the MCS computation can benefit from local minimisation. As future work, we wish to design a practical implementation and evaluate it experimentally against state-of-the-art techniques, eg. the BDD-based routines [17, 18, 27, 28] used in the FSAP platform. Given that integer constraint solving is needed to deal with time, we foresee that there might also be room for using decision procedures for such a theory, eg. MathSAT [11, 23] . Finally, we would like to integrate such algorithms into the FSAP platform [13] .
Further issues we would like to address include dynamic aspects (see eg. [22] ), that we have only sketched in this paper for lack of space. In particular, we would like to investigate the problem of sequential dependencies and failure duration, and their representation inside the fault tree. Finally, it would be interesting to adapt our algorithms to the truncated computation of prime implicants described in [28] .
